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ARTICLE
SQUARE PEGS DON'T FIT IN ROUND HOLES: THE
IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT'S ELIMINATION OF
THE PRIVATE FUND EXEMPTION ON PRIVATE EQUITY
FUND ADVISERS
Joshua C. Dawson' & Paul I. Foley*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
"Dodd-Frank Act")1 was signed into law on July 21, 2010. The Dodd-Frank
Act marked the most comprehensive change to financial law in the United
States since the Great Depression.2 The stated objective of the Dodd-Frank
Act was "[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end'too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes."3 While these were laudable goals, especially in light of the
financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession that preceded the Dodd-Frank
Act's adoption, good intentions do not necessarily yield intended results-
especially when Congress is involved.
The Dodd-Frank Act contains over 848 pages of financial reform, and is
broken up into sixteen different titles.4 This Article focuses on one such
title-Title IV. Tide IV of the Dodd-Frank Act removed the so-called
"Private Fund Exemption"' from registration under the Investment
t Joshua C. Dawson is the Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW
REVIEW, Volume 9; J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2015); B.S., Marketing
and Business Management, Liberty University (2010).
* Paul J. Foley is a Partner at Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP where he focuses
his practice on corporate and securities law, and particularly on the regulation on private
funds and investment advisers.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
2. The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not To Fail, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21547784.
3. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the "Advisers Act").6 The removal of the
Private Fund Exemption was intended to require private fund investment
advisers, who had historically relied upon this exemption, to register as
investment advisers under the Advisers Act.7 This change was Congress's
attempt to address the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme,' although the private
fund Mr. Madoff professed to run did not, in fact, exist. More importantly,
the investment adviser to Mr. Madoffs non-existent private fund was
registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC"), had been examined by the SEC's staff, and the SEC apparently did
not uncover the fact that no fund existed until later when Mr. Madoff
confessed to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation that he was
simply running a fraudulent Ponzi scheme.9 So, Congress's "solution" to the
Madoff scandal was to make existent private fund investment advisers
register with the SEC and be subject to the same SEC rules and
examinations that failed to uncover Mr. Madoffs fraud.
Title IV's elimination of the Private Fund Exemption also ineloquently
lumped investment advisers to large private equity funds with investment
advisers to large hedge funds. ° As a result of Title IV, both are generally
now required to register as investment advisers with the SEC, despite the
fact that hedge funds generally trade passively in publicly offered securities.
Conversely, private equity funds generally invest in and provide operational
and managerial assistance to private operating companies. These
dramatically different investment activities make it impractical to regulate
both types of funds under the one-size-fits-all Adviser's Act and the rules
6. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I to -21 (2012).
7. Kevin A. Zambrowicz, Investment Adviser Regulation Post-Madoff: A Brave New
World, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 373, 376 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.law
.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=jbtl.
8. United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244-46 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
9. See Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, lARD # 2625, Application for Investment
Adviser Registration (Form ADV) (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/iapd
/content/viewform/advO22005/Sections/iapd.AdvldentifyinglnfoSection.aspx?ORG PK=2625&
RGLTRPK=50000&STATECD=&FLNGPK=0262B1 1C0008014200BE1FE001EB5709056C8
CCO; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 899, 899-900, available at http://scholarship.law.
georgetown.edu/cgiviewcontent.cgi?article=1616&context=facpub.
10. "Large" is over $150 million in assets under management. 17 C.F.R. 275.203(m)-i
(2011) (providing that a manager with over $150 million in assets under management must
register with the SEC).
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promulgated thereunder, which were largely designed with passive
investment activity in publicly traded companies in mind."
This Article provides an overview of the primary challenges faced by
investment advisers to private equity funds in the wake of the elimination of
the Private Fund Exemption. Part II of this Article provides a general
overview of, and background regarding, the Advisers Act and the Private
Fund Exemption. Part III discusses a rule passed by the SEC in 2004 that
effectively eliminated the Private Fund Exemption for hedge fund
managers, but left it intact for private equity fund advisers. Part IV
highlights the significant distinctions between hedge funds and private
equity funds. Part V describes the implications of the Dodd-Frank Act's
removal of the Private Fund Exemption on private equity fund advisers.
Part VI provides a summary of certain issues that the elimination of the
Private Fund Exemption has created for the SEC. Finally, Part VII discusses
various potential solutions to the issues associated with the elimination of
the Private Fund Exemption.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
The Advisers Act was signed into law in 1940 because Congress
concluded that federal regulation of investment advisers, particularly
questionable ones, was necessary in order to maintain the confidence and
integrity of the country's national securities markets. 2 Prior to 1940,
11. Jason E. Brown, Application of the Investment Advisers Act to Private Equity
Advisers, 44 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 83, 83 (Apr. 2011) available at
http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/1433e480-fd7O-48ba-aaaa-
6eb0156ee532/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8136970b- 17bc-4b8c-b 117-
703044lf2734/BrownRSCRFinal.pdf.
12. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 201 (2012). Section 201 finds that:
Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission made pursuant to section 30 of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, and facts otherwise disclosed and ascertained, it
is hereby found that investment advisers are of national concern, in that,
among other things-
(1) their advice, counsel, publications, writing, analyses, and reports are
furnished and distributed, and their contracts, subscription agreements, and
other arrangements with- clients are negotiated and performed, by the use of
mails and means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce;
(2) their advice, counsel, publications, writings, analyses, and reports
customarily relate to the purchase or sale of securities traded on national
securities exchanges and in interstate over-the-counter markets, securities
issued by companies engaged in business in interstate commerce, and securities
issued by national banks and member banks of the Federal Reserve System; and
20151
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investment advisers that were in the business of exclusively rendering
investment advice were not within the scope of the SEC's jurisdiction. 3 For
example, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), 4 regulated securities market professionals by requiring
brokers (i.e., those who trade securities on behalf of others for
compensation)' 5 and dealers (i.e., those who buy from others or sell
securities they own to others for compensation) 6 to be registered and
regulated as broker-dealers, and also provided for general oversight of the
securities markets. However, the Exchange Act did not include those
exclusively rendering securities investment advice in its purview. 7 This
created a gap in regulation that was ultimately filled through the enactment
of the Advisers Act.' 8
The Advisers Act mandates that, unless otherwise excepted or exempted,
investment advisers must register with the SEC.19 The Adviser's Act defines
the term "Investment Adviser" to include:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
(3) the foregoing transactions occur in such volume as substantially to affect
interstate commerce, national securities exchanges, and other securities
markets, the national banking system and the national economy.
Id.
13. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 788 (rev. 5th ed. 2006).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), available at
http://www.legisworks.org/congress/73/publaw-291.pdf.
15. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 219 (9th ed. 2009) ("A person engaged in the business of
conducting securities transactions for the accounts of others."); see 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers §
1 (2009) ("Two elements must be met to find that one is acting as a 'broker': (1) the person
must act for compensation, and (2) the person must act on behalf of someone else.").
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (9th ed. 2009) ("A person or firm that buys and sells
securities for its own account as a principal, and then sells to a customer.").
17. HAZEN, supra note 13, at 788.
18. Id.
19. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80-b3(c) (2006).
Except as provided in subsection (b) and section 203A, it shall be unlawful for
any investment adviser, unless registered under this section, to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection
with his or its business as an investment adviser.
[Vol. 9:445
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compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities....
Unless otherwise excepted from this definition or exempted from
registration, an individual or entity that fits within this definition is
required, in addition to registering as an investment adviser with the SEC,
to file periodic reports on Form ADV with the SEC, 21 maintain specified
books and records and make them available to the SEC upon request, 22 and
have its client contracts and interactions regulated by the SEC.23 Investment
advisers to private equity funds and investment advisers to hedge funds
both fall within the definition of "investment adviser" under the Advisers
Act.
Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, both investment advisers
to private equity funds and investment advisers to hedge funds were able to
rely upon the broad exemption from registration provided under the
Private Fund Exemption. 4 Previously, an investment adviser was eligible to
rely upon the Private Fund Exemption if it "(1) had fewer than fifteen
clients during the previous twelve months, (2) did not publicly hold itself
out as an investment adviser, and (3) did not advise registered investment
companies," such as mutual funds. 5 In order to fall below the fifteen-client
requirement necessary to rely upon the Private Fund Exemption,
investment advisers to both private equity funds and hedge funds took
advantage of the, then in place, counting rule, which allowed investment
advisers to "count as clients the funds they advised ... and not individual
20. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(11), Pub. L. No. 112-90 (2012).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2006).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2006); see HAZEN, supra note 13, at 799 (in addition to
having to file Form ADV-S, an investment adviser is also required to keep current records
that include "balance sheets, income statements, and a journal of accounts; copies of all
communications sent and received relating to investment advice or the execution of orders;
copies of all notices, letters, reports, and advertisements distributed by the adviser to more
than ten customers, and records of all securities transactions.").
23. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2006); see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 410 (3d ed. 2009) ("The Act prohibits contracts whereby the adviser's
compensation is dependent upon a share of the client's capital appreciation or gain." The Act
also requires that an "advisory contract must by its terms preclude assignment of the
contract unless the client or customer consents.").
24. Advisers Act, § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
25. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., A Brief History of Hedge Fund Adviser Registration and Its
Consequences for Private Equity and Venture Capital Advisers, I HARV. Bus. L. REv. ONLINE
39 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Sjostrom-
OnlineArticle3.pdf.
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investors in the funds."26 The Private Fund Exemption was a popular
exemption that was utilized by the vast majority of advisers to hedge funds,
private equity funds, and venture capital funds prior to its elimination.
III. THE SEC'S 2004 HEDGE FUND RULE AND THE GOLDSTEIN DECISION
In 2004, the SEC proposed and finalized a new rule and amendments
under the Advisers Act 27 that "require[d] advisers to certain private
investment pools ('hedge funds') to register with the Commission .... "28
The primary reason for this new rule was the SEC's concern with the rapid
growth of the hedge fund industry and the increased fraud related to that
growth. Consequently, the rule became known as the "hedge fund rule. 29
Importantly, the hedge fund rule did not require investment advisers to
private equity funds to register with the SEC.
In the adopting release for the hedge fund rule, the SEC amended the
definition of "private fund," thereby excluding certain investment advisers,
who could continue to utilize the Private Fund Exemption, including those
who advised private equity funds.30 At the time, the SEC included the
following in its press release:
[T]he term "private funds" is limited to investment pools with
redemption features that offer investors a short-term right to
withdraw their assets from management, based on their
individual liquidity needs and other preferences, in a manner
similar to clients that directly open an account with an adviser.
This condition will ensure that the definition does not
inadvertently include private equity .funds, venture capital funds,
or other funds that require long-term commitment of capital.3'
The hedge fund rule was short lived. In 2006, the D.C. Federal Circuit
Court, in Goldstein v. SEC,32 ruled that the hedge fund rule directly
26. Id.
27. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-
2333.htm#IIE.
28. Id.
29. Id. At the time the new rule was being proposed, the SEC had this to say: "In the last
five years alone, hedge fund assets have grown 260 percent, and in the last year, hedge fund
assets have grown over 30 percent." Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 9:445
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conflicted with the purpose underlying the Advisers Act.33 In so doing, the
court invalidated the rule and tossed out the SEC's narrowly-tailored
definition of "private fund" with it. After the Goldstein decision, the broad
exemption provided under the Private Fund Exemption remained in place.
But, "ironically, the private fund industry, [particularly, the private equity
fund industry,] may have been better off had the SEC prevailed in
Goldstein" due to the fact that if the SEC had won, then Congress might"not have revisited the hedge fund adviser registration issue in the Dodd-
Frank Act."34
IV. HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS, AND THE DIFFERENCE
In proposing and adopting the hedge fund rule in 2004, the SEC relied
heavily on a report entitled Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds (the
"Report") to justify the need for investment advisers to hedge funds to be
required to register with the SEC.3" The Report not only described the
fraudulent conduct of hedge fund advisers, but it also described both the
similarities and the distinctions between hedge funds and private equity
funds.
According to the Report, both private equity funds and hedge funds were"unregistered investment vehicle [s] in which investors pool money to invest
in securities."36 In addition, both private equity funds and hedge funds are
also generally organized as limited partnerships. Because they are both
privately offered, they each also solicit investors directly, or through a
registered broker-dealer, rather than through general solicitation, general
advertising, or public offerings of the securities.3" Due to the requirements
associated with the private offering of securities, 39 both types of funds
"typically include[d] high net worth individuals and families, pension
funds, endowments, banks and insurance companies."4° Finally, the Report
found that like "hedge funds, many private equity funds establish offshore
33. Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 PEPP. Bus. L.J. 111,
114 (2007), available at https://law.pepperdine.edu/jbel/content/voll/zaun-final.pdf.
34. Sjostrom, supra note 25, at 40.
35. Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-.506 (2012).
40. Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, at 7 (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds09O3.pdf.
20151
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'mirror' funds that are typically managed by the general partner of the
companion U.S. fund and have similar investments."4'
The Report also described the characteristics in which private equity
funds differ from hedge funds.42 First, "[p]rivate equity investors typically
commit to invest a certain amount of money with the fund over the life of
the fund, and make their contributions in response to 'capital calls' from the
fund's general partner."43 The Report also stated that because "private
equity funds typically do not retain a pool of uninvested capital, their
general partners make a capital call when they have identified or expect to
identify a portfolio company in which the private equity fund will invest.""
The Report further indicated that, unlike hedge funds, private equity funds
are "long-term investments, provide for liquidation at the end of a term
specified in the fund's governing documents, and offer little, if any,
opportunity for investors to redeem their investments."4" These and other
material differences between private equity funds and hedge funds illustrate
how it is difficult to regulate both types of funds under the same regulatory
scheme.
V. TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
As discussed above, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the
Private Fund Exemption.' The elimination of the Private Fund Exemption
effectively requires investment advisers of private equity funds to register
with the SEC, provided that their assets under management exceed $150
million.47 This has subjected investment advisers of large private equity
funds and investment advisers of large hedge funds to a one-size-fits-all
regulatory scheme under the Advisers Act. The result, particularly for
investment advisers to private equity funds, has meant being subject to
unnecessary, inapplicable, and, in some cases, dual regulation. Indeed,
many industry observers question the benefits of investment advisers of
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Rules Implementing Amendment to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, IA Release No. 3221, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf.
47. Id. at 6 n.5.
[Vol. 9:445
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private equity funds being regulated pursuant to the Advisers Act.4" While
observers question the public benefit of the registration of investment
advisers to private equity funds, the compliance costs for private equity
fund advisers are significant-often exceeding hundreds of thousands of
dollars.49 The following sub-sections highlight just a few of the reasons why
regulating private equity funds in the same one-size-fits-all approach under
the Advisers Act is unwarranted.
A. Private Equity Funds Do Not Present a Systematic Risk
The Small Business Investor Alliance (the "SBIA") reported to Congress
that private equity funds, "especially private [equity] funds with assets
under management of less than $500 million and unlevered funds, did not
cause or contribute to the financial crisis."0 Further, the "typical private
[equity] fund in the lower middle market invests over the course of three to
five years in a portfolio of ten to twenty companies,"51 which has allowed
the funds to spread risk among several different investments in many
companies. Private equity funds also do not "create systematic risk by
trading in synthetic financial instruments."52 Rather, they "invest directly in
small businesses."53 Finally, as has been articulated above, unlike many
hedge funds and some mutual funds, private equity funds invest for the
long term and investors in private equity funds understand "that [their]
capital will be committed for an extended period of time."54 Because of this,
private equity funds are "not subject to quarterly redemption events that
can have a cascading effect in [the event of] a systematic market
breakdown."5
48. Sarah N. Lynch, House Republicans Question SEC Oversight of Private Equity Funds,
REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2013, 7:02:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13us-house-
sec-privateequity-idUSBRE98COEO20130913.
49. Id.
50. Legislative Proposals to Relieve the Red Tape Burden on Investors and Job Creators:
Hearing on H.R. 1105 Before the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 133d Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of
Marc A. Reich, President, Ironwood Counsel on behalf of Small Business Investor Alliance),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-bal6-wstate-mreich-
20130523.pdf [hereinafter Reich Statement].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
2015]
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B. Inapplicability of SEC Rules to Private Equity Funds
The Advisers Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder by the SEC, are
primarily designed for investment advisers that invest passively in publicly
traded securities, like most hedge fund managers, and are not designed for
private equity fund advisers. While a few examples are provided below,
other examples of this, which are outside the scope of this Article, include
recordkeeping requirements that relate specifically to securities trading,
trade error requirements, and various other requirements that are not
relevant or, at the very least, should be different for private equity fund
advisers.
First, as part of stringent recordkeeping requirements, 6 the SEC requires
registered advisers to retain and archive email messages so that they may be
retrieved, searched, and reviewed by the adviser's Chief Compliance Officer
or a regulator.17 According to testimony by the SBIA, the primary reason for
these reviews is to "detect illegal activities such as insider trading in
publically traded securities."" Due to the fact that private equity firms
generally do not buy or sell public securities, this is a regulation that drives
up compliance costs for private fund advisers without providing significant
additional investor protection. Indeed, all registered investment advisers are
required to adopt a code of ethics that is designed to detect and deter
insider trading in public companies, which, unlike for hedge fund
managers, is not a significant issue for most private equity fund advisers.
Another example is the SEC's custody rule. 9 The current version of the
Custody Rule, adopted in 2009, requires private funds to hire third party"qualified custodians" to hold each client's funds and securities." From a
private equity standpoint, this rule served no purpose because the securities
held by private equity funds are typically "little more than a stack of
56. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2011); see INVESTOR PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF THE DODD-
FRANK ACT 25 (Caroline S. Jensen ed. 2011).
57. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investment Adviser Use of Social Media, 2 Nat'l Examination
Alert 1, at 6 (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalert-
socialmedia.pdf.
58. Reich Statement,.supra note 50, at 7.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2010).
60. Id.; see INVESTOR PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT, supra note 56, at
26 (stating that "[a]n adviser has custody of client funds or securities if it 'holds, directly or
indirectly, client funds or securities, or has any authority to obtain possession of them in
connection with advisory services it provides to clients."' If an adviser has custody, then
"[t]he adviser must maintain client funds and securities with 'qualified custodians,' such as a
bank or a broker-dealer, and make due inquiry to ensure that the qualified custodian sends
account statements directly to the clients.").
[Vol. 9:445
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documents specific to a transaction."6 Further, the securities that they
typically hold are not "easily transferable or negotiable document[s] that
-would have some potential value in the hand of an unscrupulous third
party. '62 Despite this, in March 2013, the SEC's Office of Inspections and
Examinations published a risk alert finding that non-compliance with the
custody rule was among the most common issues found in routine
examinations of private equity fund advisers.63 Nearly three years after the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and nearly a year and a half after private
equity advisers could no longer rely upon the Private Funds Exemption to
avoid registration with the SEC and therefore became subject to the
Custody Rule, SEC's Division of Investment Management issued a
"Guidance Update" that placed limits on the types of privately offered
securities, particularly those most frequently held by private equity advisers,
that must be custodied by qualified custodians.' The significant costs
incurred by private equity fund advisers for compliance with the custody
rule provisions, which the SEC has effectively acknowledged were
unnecessary, are not known.
Third, the Advisers Act places a significant emphasis on the valuation of
the securities managed by investment advisers. For example, Form ADV,
the form which investment advisers use to register and are required to keep
up-to-date, requires private fund advisers to "determine the current market
value (or fair value) of the private fund's assets."65 This is primarily because
passive securities advisers tend to mark their securities to market and
charge their management and performance fees based on the current
market value of their assets under management.? Conversely, private equity
61. Reich Statement, supra note 50, at 6.
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Significant Deficiencies Involving
Adviser Custody and Safety of Client Assets, 3 National Exam Program Risk Alert 1, 3 (Mar.
4, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/custody-risk-alert.pdf ("The
custody-related deficiencies NEP staff observed can be grouped into four categories: failure
by an adviser to recognize that it has 'custody' as defined under the custody rule; failures to
comply with the rule's 'surprise exam' requirement; failure to comply with the 'qualified
custodian' requirements; and failures to comply with the audit approach for pooled
investment vehicles.").
64. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Division of Investment Management, IM Guidance Update
No. 2013-04 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance
/im-guidance-2013-04.pdf.
65. Form ADV: Instructions for Part 1A, at 9, available at http://www.sec.gov/about
/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf.
66. Ryan C, Fuhrmann, Hedge Fund Fees: Exotic Expenses, FORBES (July 16, 2013,
11:09:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/07/16/hedge-fund-fees-exotic-
2015]
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advisers do not typically charge their management and performance based
fee on the current value of the portfolio company interests in which they
invest, but rather charge their management fees based on the actual amount
invested and their performance fees on the amount actually realized when
the interests are sold.67 While private equity fund advisers have been found
to attempt to inflate their assets under management when fundraising,61 the
Advisers Act's valuation requirements do not effectively address this
concern. Therefore, they create additional work and increase compliance
costs for private equity fund advisers without providing meaningful
additional protection to the public.
Finally, the Advisers Act requires that an "adviser must seek to obtain the
execution of transactions for clients in such a manner that the client's total
cost or proceeds in each transaction is the most favorable under the
circumstances. "69 This is known as the best execution rule. Under the best
execution rule, "an adviser should consider the full range and quality of a
broker's services when placing brokerage, including, among other things,
execution capability, commission rate, financial responsibility,
responsiveness to the adviser, and the value of any research provided."7"
The best execution rule assumes that multiple brokers have access to the
same securities investments, such as broker-dealers do with publicly traded
securities, and the primary distinguishing factor among brokers is the
execution of the transaction. While private equity funds may utilize
business brokers to help them find and complete investments in portfolio
companies, these brokers often have exclusive rights to assist the applicable
portfolio company with the sale of its equity. Further, the availability of
equity interests in portfolio companies in which private equity fund
expenses/ ("Hedge funds are built to outperform an index by a wide margin, and those that
do so are generally able to charge a 2% management fee (2% of the hedge fund's assets) as
well as a performance fee for as much as 20% of the annual gains.").
67. Fees for Hedge Funds and Private Equity Down to 1.4 and 17, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8,
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21595942-cost-investing-
alternative-assets-fallingslowly-down- 14-and- 17 ("Tweaks around how profits are calculated
have also favoured investors: whereas private equity bosses once got a share of profits made
on each investment, they are now more likely to get paid based on the performance of an
entire decade-long fund. Not only does this delay their bonuses, it puts them at risk if
bumper profits are wiped out by dud deals.").
68. Andrew J. Bowden, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
Remarks at the Private Fund Compliance Forum 2014 New York, NY (May 6, 2014),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541735361.
69. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation of Investment Advisers, at 25 (Mar.
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-investman/rplaze-042012.pdf.
70. Id.
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advisers typically invest is usually quite limited, and portfolio companies
often place more emphasis on what a private equity investor brings to the
table with regard to potential managerial and business execution experience
than on the price that the private equity investor is offering. This is yet
another requirement under the Advisers Act that has little apparent utility
for private equity fund advisers or the investors they serve, but registered
private equity fund advisers are required to seek best execution when
dealing with business brokers, who are far different from the public
securities brokers envisioned by the rule.7'
C. Dual Regulation
In 1958, Congress enacted an amended form of the Small Business
Investment Act of 1953 (the "SBA Act").7" The SBA Act created a market for"small business investing by establishing a program to stimulate and
supplement the flow of private equity capital for the sound financing of
business operations for growth and expansion. 7 3 Pursuant to the SBA Act,
the Small Business Administration (the "SBA") was created to "to maintain
and strengthen the Nation's economy by enabling the establishment and
viability of small businesses, and by assisting the economic recovery of
communities after disasters."74 After various amendments to the SBA Act in
1958, the SBA became responsible for establishing a "sound regulatory
structure, designed for private equity investing, that provides a robust body
of rules and safeguards for the industry."75 While the SEC provides an
exemption from registration under the Advisers Act to advisers that provide
advice to Small Business Investment Companies ("SBICs"), this exemption
is limited to investment advisers who exclusively advise SBICs.76 Therefore,
if an investment adviser advises both SBICs and private equity funds, that
investment adviser's advisory activities with regard to the SBICs must also
comply with the Advisers Act and the rules promulgated thereunder.77
71. See supra text accompanying note 43.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 14A (2010).
73. Reich Statement, supra note 50, at 8.
74. Final Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing Rules, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN. (Jan. 23,
2012), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files
/SBAFinalPlanRestropectiveAnalysisofExistingRules23Janl2.pdf.
75. Reich Statement, supra note 50, at 8 (emphasis added).
76. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b)(7) (2011), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(7) (2011).
77. Reich Statement, supra note 50, at 8.
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This dual regulation by the SBA and the SEC often results in inconsistent
and sometimes conflicting regulation. In addition, it does little to protect
investors, and does not reduce the likelihood of systematic risk. Instead, it
reduces the amount of capital available for private equity funds to invest in
small businesses, thus reducing the overall effectiveness of the private equity
funds and the mission of the SBA.
An example of duplicative regulation is SBA and SEC examinations. The
SBA requires that all advisers of SBICs comply with financial and
compliance audits.78 These SBA audits and financial examinations are
conducted at least every two years and include: (1) whether licensees are
complying with the SBA Act and implementing regulations; (2) the
financial condition of licensees and SBA's financial vulnerabilities, and (3)
the accuracy of information submitted to the SBA.79 The SEC also requires
registered investment advisers to comply with its inspections and
examinations." The SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (the "OCIE") has created particular examinations that are
designed to: (1) improve compliance; (2) prevent and detect fraud;
(3) monitor risk; and (4) inform regulatory policy." The SEC has set a goal
to examine these advisers at least once every three years even though, as
discussed below, the SEC has fallen well short of that goal." While the SBA
limits its examinations to the SBICs managed by the adviser, the SEC's
examinations also cover the SBICs managed by the adviser and the SEC.
One adviser to an SBIC estimated that the cost to be examined by the SEC
after being examined by the SBA was hundreds of thousands of dollars.83
Dual examinations and regulation of SBICs make even less sense when
considering the similarities and the limited differences between the SEC and
SBA financial audit standards.84 The SEC and SBA financial audits have
78. Small Business Administration, Improved Examination Quality Can Strengthen SBA's
Oversight of Small Business Investment Companies, Report No. 13-22, available at http://www
.sba.gov/sites/default/files/oig/[c]Audit%20ReportO/o2013-22%20Improved%20Examination%20
Quality%/o2OCan%2Strengthen%20SBA's%20Oversight%20oft/o20Small%20Business%20Invest
ment%20Companies.pdf.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf.
81. Id. at 2.
82. See discussion infra Part VI.
83. Reich Statement, supra note 50, at 8.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2010); 13 C.F.R. § 107.20 (2010).
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exactly the same asset verification process. s5 Other than the manner in
which certain financial information is presented, the only material
difference between financial audits conducted pursuant to generally
accepted accounting practices ("GAAP Audits"), which are required by the
SEC, and SBA financial audits is the more conservative asset valuation in
certain circumstances under SBA. 6 Performing a GAAP Audit, or,
alternatively, a surprise audit to comply with the Custody Rule, is a
significant expense that is borne by the fund's investors without providing
any investor protection in addition to that provided by SBA financial audits.
VI. THE EFFECT ON THE SEC
The SEC was required by section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act to conduct
a study on enhancing investment adviser examinations."' This study was
published by the SEC in 2011 and among its findings it noted that the
investment adviser examination program faced significant capacity
challenges." In particular, it found that OCIE's staff was unlikely to keep
85. SBA Audits are required to be conducted pursuant to generally accepted audit
standards ("GAAS"), as such auditors conducting an SBA Audit verify the assets of the SBIC
in exactly the same manner as they would in a SEC GAAP Audit. This verification process is
one of the primary reasons for the Custody Rule's audit requirement. Therefore, SBA Audits
provide the same level of investor protection and asset verification as GAAP Audits.
Compare Small Business Administration, Appendix 14: Accounting Standards and Financial
Reporting Requirements for Small Business Investment Companies 125 (1999), available at
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/inv-standards.pdf, with Securities & Exchange
Commission, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Examination Priorities
for 2014, at 4 (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-
examination-program-priorities-2014.pdf, and 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4) (2010), and
Commission Guidance Regarding Independent Public Accountant Engagements Performed
Pursuant to Rule 206(4)-2 Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2969, at 3 (Dec. 30, 2009).
86. The primary differences between valuation under a GAAP Audit and valuation
under an SBA Audit are that (1) an increase in value above investment cost may be reflected
in the reported value only if it has a specific permitted basis under the SBIC licensee's
valuation policy; (2) liquidity discounts, which are prohibited under the GAAP, must be
considered for inclusion in reported value; and (3) the reported value of interest-bearing
securities is not adjusted for changes in interest rates. Compare Small Business
Administration, Appendix 15: Valuation Guidelines for Small Business Investment Companies
145-46 (1999), available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/inv-valuation.pdf,
with Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, FASAB Handbook of Federal
Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements SFFAS 1-12, as amended (June 30, 2014),
available at http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/2014 fasabhandbook.pdf.
87. See generally Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations, supra note 80.
88. Id. at 23.
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pace with the growth of registered investment advisers. 9 This study was
prophetic in the sense that the SEC has continued to battle these particular
challenges as the different pieces of the Dodd-Frank Act have gone into
effect.
The SEC, through its 2015 budget proposal, suggested to Congress that it
was inadequately funded to keep pace with the complexities of the securities
markets and the broad responsibilities bestowed upon it.9 Among those
responsibilities, the SEC is currently overseeing approximately 11,000
investment advisers, 10,000 mutual funds, as well as reviewing the
disclosures and financial statements of approximately 2,500 exempt
reporting advisers to hedge fund and other private funds.91 As noted in Part
III, these numbers are likely to continue to grow during the near future due
to the growth of use of private funds.
Among the more important items that are discussed in the budget
proposal is the need for more examiners to examine private funds to ensure
compliance with federal laws. In theory, these are important initiatives, but
the issue for the SEC in this regard is that it has historically only "focused
on public asset managers such as mutual funds that have been highly
regulated since 1940," not private funds.92 The SEC Chair reported to a U.S.
House of Representatives appropriations panel that the SEC only examined
around nine percent of registered investment fund advisers in 2013. 9' The
2015 proposed budget also reported that more than forty percent of the
registered advisers have never been examined.94
To correct this issue, the SEC has proposed enormous budget increases
over the past four years.95 The overall proposed budget for 2015 requested
89. Id.
90. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2015 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2015
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2013 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 5, 56,
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy15congbudgjust.pdf [hereinafter FY 2015
Congressional Budget Justification].
91. Id. at 4.
92. Greg Roumeliotis & Sarah Lynch, Exclusive: SEC Forms Squad to Examine Private
Funds - Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/4/07/us-sec-
privatefunds-idUSBREA360M420140407.
93. Id.; see FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note 90, at 4.
94. FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note 90, at 56.
95. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 11, 15,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfyl2congbudgjust.pdf (An overall proposed budget increase for
2012 of $305,936,000, a 23% increase over 2011. The Compliance Inspections and
Examinations proposed budget increase for 2012 was $63,856,000, a 27% increase over
2011.); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 14,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf (An overall proposed budget increase for
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$1.7 billion, which is a proposed increase of 33% from 2013 and a 16%
increase from 2014.96 Of that $1.7 billion, $373,433,000 is requested for
compliance inspections and examinations, which represents an increase of
38% from 2013 and a 24% increase from 2014.97 With those proposed funds,
the SEC stated that one of its top priorities will be to hire 316 additional
examiners to increase the percentage of investment advisers examined each
year, the rate of first-time examinations, and the examination coverage of
investment advisers and newly registered fund advisers.9"
The likelihood of the SEC being granted its proposed 2015 budget is slim.
From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2014, the SEC's budget has
increased more than 55%.99 Due to this rapidly increasing budget, the SEC
will most likely see a result similar to its 2014 budget request. In 2014, the
SEC requested $1.674 billion, but only received $1.47 billion from
Congress. °° This represents about 80% of what the SEC requested. If that
holds true for 2015, then the SEC will continue to be inadequately funded
and will be unable to properly examine a meaningful percentage of the
currently registered investment advisers.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Article discusses three potential solutions. Each recommendation
provides a different perspective on how to address the complex issues
relating to private equity fund advisers. The different recommendations
2013 of $206,219,000, a 15% increase over 2012. The Compliance Inspections and
Examinations proposed budget increase for 2013 was $43,870,000, a 16% increase over
2012.); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2014
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2012 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 16-17,
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf (An overall proposed budget
increase for 2014 of $256,486,000, an 18% increase over 2013. The Compliance Inspections
and Examinations proposed budget increase for 2014 was $73,914,000, a 26% increase over
2013.); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2015 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2015
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2013 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 16,
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy15congbudgjust.pdf (An overall proposed budget
increase for 2015 of $236,341,000, a 16% increase over 2014. The Compliance Inspections
and Examinations proposed budget increase for 2014 was $72,761,000, a 24% increase over
2014.).
96. FY2015 Congressional Budget Justi fication, supra note 90, at 16.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Memorandum on Oversight of the SEC's Agenda, Operations, and FY 2015 Budget
Request, H.R. Rep. Comm. on Fin. Srvs. (Apr. 24, 2014), available at
http://fmancialservices.house.gov/uploadedfles/042914 fcmemo.pdf.
100. FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note 90, at 15.
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present what the authors believe to be the best solutions for combining
Congress's interest in minimizing systematic risk to the financial markets
with the forms of regulation least harmful to private equity fund advisers.
A. Investment Adviser Act Registration Exemptions for Private Equity
Funds
On March 13, 2013, Congressman Robert Hurt introduced the Small
Business Capital Access and Job Preservation Act ("H.R. 1105").o1 In
general the bill provides that:
[N]o investment adviser shall be subject to the registration or
reporting requirements of this title with respect to the provision
of investment advice relating to a private equity fund or funds,
provided that each such fund has not borrowed and does not
have outstanding a principal amount in excess of twice its
invested capital commitments. °2
H.R. 1105 provides a broad exemption for private equity fund advisers,
but it does not alter the SEC's "authority [under the Dodd-Frank Act] to
require that all private fund advisers maintain records and make them
available to the SEC for the protection of investors or for the assessment of
systemic risk by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.""0 3 H.R. 1105 will
require the SEC to create new final rules defining what records private
equity fund advisers will be required to maintain.'"' H.R. 1105 will also
require the SEC to define what a "private equity fund" is, which it failed to
do in its final rules issued after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.'0°
H.R. 1105 would allow private equity fund advisers to avoid needless and
burdensome registration with the SEC. H.R. 1105 would also allow private
equity funds to avoid creating costly reports to comply with Investment
Adviser Act requirements. The proposed legislation would also remove dual
regulation problems for those private equity fund advisers that are currently
subject to both the SBA and SEC. Finally, and most importantly to the SEC,
H.R. 1105 would still require private equity investment advisers to maintain
certain detailed records and make them available to the SEC if suspicious
101. H.R. 1105, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
113hrl 105rfs/pdf/BILLS- 113hr1105rfs.pdf.
102. Id.
103. H.R* REP. No. 113-276, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.govlfdsys
/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt276/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt276.pdf.
104. H.R. 1105.
105. Id.
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behavior should arise or a complaint is received. On a fundamental level,
H.R. 1105 supports a public policy of providing for more funds to be
available to small businesses, and thereby providing needed capital for
economic growth.
H.R. 1105 passed through the House of Representatives on December 4,
2013, but was strongly opposed by House Democrats. 10 6 The final vote was
254 for and 159 against." 7 The House vote probably foreshadows how
Senate Democrats will receive the bill. The bill has also received criticism
from the Office of the President in a Statement of Administration Policy,
which stated that the proposed legislation would undermine the "protection
and regulatory oversight implemented by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under Title IV of the [Dodd-Frank Act].'u10 Even if H.R.
1105 does not become law, it does provide an example of what an
exemption for private equity fund advisers might look like.
B. Investment Advisers Create a Self-Regulatory Organization
In 2008, then Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson headed up a study
that resulted in a report and recommendation entitled The Department of
the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (the
"Treasury Report")." 9 In the Treasury Report, Paulson recommends that a
Self-regulatory Organization ("SRO") be established for investment advisers
because there was a growing trend of investor confusion on the differences
between investment advisers and broker-dealers."0 In light of this, the
Treasury Report's discussion on why an SRO would be good for the
investment adviser industry is particularly relevant to this Article. The
Treasury Report makes the following arguments in favor of an SRO:
Self-regulation in financial markets and services is often
characterized as the first line of defense in preserving market
integrity and protecting against fraud and abuse. A self-
regulatory system can help to cover any gaps in federal
106. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 622, (Aug. 14, 2014,
5:21:00PM), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/rolU622.xml.
107. Id.
108. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY: H.R. 1105-
SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL ACCESS AND JOB PRESERVATION ACT (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/1 13/saphr1 105r_20131203.pdf.
109. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases
/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
110. Id.at125-26.
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regulation and can typically respond to market developments
more quickly than can government oversight. Whereas
government regulators are mainly focused on antifraud
enforcement, SROs can adopt and amend industry rules that
address a wider range of activity and professional conduct. As
private bodies, SROs may adopt rules and aspire to standards
that extend beyond statutory or regulatory requirements while at
the same time maintaining a flexibility that can help to better
protect investors and encourage innovation in the offering of
financial services and products.
In general, SROs can impose governance standards, set rules, and
undertake enforcement and disciplinary proceedings with
respect to their members: SROs carry out continuing education
and training of professionals at member firms in technical
competence as well as ethics; administer professional tests and
issue certifications; conduct examinations of professionals for
compliance with both SRO and federal rules; and sanction firms
that fail to comply (including barring firms and individuals from
the industry). SROs also arbitrate disputes and provide
additional sources for investor education and information. These
and other functions are typically enhanced through the direct
market knowledge and expertise that SROs possess, which can
help lead to rules that better address specific issues, or identify
solutions to emerging issues before they become widespread.
A self-regulatory system can also lead to more cost-efficient
regulation. Although a federal regulator typically oversees SROs
and SRO rulemaking, the industry directly bears the costs of
regulation, which results in significant savings to taxpayers. An
SRO can raise revenues through registration, membership, and
other fees paid by its members, which the SRO can then use to
support its monitoring, enforcement, and training programs.
This private source of funding for SROs may even be more
flexible than that for government regulators, which typically
depend upon Congress and an annual appropriations process."
The SRO proposal has some compelling aspects because it would allow
the investment advisory industry to be basically autonomous, with direct
SEC supervision over only the SRO and not over the individual advisers.
Like the exemption proposal, an SRO has the potential of reducing the
111. Id. at 122-23.
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amount of useless or duplicative regulation, as the SRO can create narrowly
tailored rules that are specific to the investment adviser industry. Further,
the lack of SEC investment adviser examinations, noted earlier in this
Article, has actually created less investor protection-rather than more. An
SRO can provide that line of protection for investors, because of its
exclusive concentration on investment advisers. In addition to the potential
benefits, Paulson also addressed some of the potential negative aspects of an
SRO:
Self-regulation is not free of criticism. First and foremost is the
potential for redundant or duplicative regulatory burdens,
whether with respect to the industry's federal regulator or one or
more additional SROs. Self-regulation is also susceptible to a
wide range of conflicts of interest, including the potential that
the SRO may have a financial interest in its members or their
business activities.11 2
To date, the SEC has only entertained the idea of an SRO for investment
advisers. However, it has not adopted an SRO approach, but rather
continued with its direct supervision approach, which has been hampered
by funding issues and the generally slow pace of government regulation.
The SRO approach has a number of flaws, but if properly executed could
provide better investor protection than the current regulatory scheme.
C. Increased Funding for the SEC
Increased funding may appear to be an obvious approach, but may be
unrealistic. There is continuing skepticism from Congress concerning the
budgets being proposed by the SEC."3 Congress demands that the SEC be
more efficient, while the SEC pleads with Congress that without more
funding the premise of the Dodd-Frank Act, of protecting the integrity of
the financial markets, will not be achieved.
Both sides have strong arguments in their favor, but political
compromise does not seem likely. The SEC has recently invested heavily in
new technologies that it hopes will make it more efficient." 4 Despite this, in
order to become more effective, the SEC will most likely need to hire
additional personnel; but with a unionized, government workforce, it may
be difficult to enact policies to incentivize its most productive workers.
Government agencies tend to talk about what they could do with more
112. Id. at 123.
113. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
114. FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note 90, at 52.
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money; however, based on the current political environment, it looks like
the SEC will need to find ways to do more with less. Moreover, additional
funding does little to solve the unique issues related to the private equity
fund advisers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The past four years have seen significant changes to investment adviser
regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act was a reaction to a major financial crisis,
but it was and is too broad in its scope. Private equity fund advisers did not
create the financial crisis and should not be punished with overregulation.
The recommendations to create an SRO and to give more funding to the
SEC to continue the current regulatory trend are unlikely to make an
immediate impact on the current regulatory environment. Conversely, a
broad exemption for private equity fund advisers from registration as
investment advisers would have an immediate impact. As discussed in this
Article, a number of strong public policy reasons exist for such an
exemption and trying to fit private equity fund advisers under a one-size-
fits-all approach offers little benefit. Small businesses make up the backbone
of our economy and private equity funds provide much needed capital to
them. Congress and the SEC should not continue to try to fit the square peg
of private equity fund advisers into the round hole of the Advisers Act.
[Vol. 9:445
